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Abstract (short) 
We argue that structural priming, or the tendency for people to repeat structural choices, 
provides an implicit method for investigating linguistic representations that should end the 
current reliance on acceptability judgments. Priming evidence supports a linguistic 
architecture involving a single ‘shallow’ level of syntax that is connected to a semantic level 
containing information about quantification, thematic relations, and information structure, as 
well as a phonological level.  Many linguistic distinctions often used to support complex 
syntactic structure are instead captured by semantics; however, the syntactic level specifies 
some ‘missing’ elements.  Structural priming further provides evidence about 
representational consistency across languages and language development.   
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Abstract (long) 
Within the cognitive sciences, most researchers assume that it is the job of linguists to 
investigate how language is represented, and that they do so largely by building theories 
based on explicit judgments about patterns of acceptability – whereas it is the task of 
psychologists to determine how language is processed, and that in doing so, they do not 
typically question the linguists’ representational assumptions. We challenge this division of 
labor, by arguing that structural priming provides an implicit method of investigating 
linguistic representations that should end the current reliance on acceptability judgments.  
Moreover, structural priming has now reached sufficient methodological maturity to provide 
substantial evidence about such representations.  We argue that evidence from speakers’ 
tendency to repeat their own and others’ structural choices supports a linguistic architecture 
involving a single ‘shallow’ level of syntax that is connected to a semantic level containing 
information about quantification, thematic relations, and information structure, as well as to a 
phonological level.  Many of the linguistic distinctions that are often used to support complex 
(or multi-level) syntactic structure are instead captured by semantics; however, the syntactic 
level includes some specification of ‘missing’ elements that are not realized at the 
phonological level.  We also show that structural priming provides evidence about the 
consistency of representations across languages and about language development.  In sum, 
we propose that structural priming provides a new basis for understanding the nature of 
language. 
  
 
Keywords: language production; linguistics; mental representation; psycholinguistics; 
semantics; structural priming; syntax  
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The cognitive science of language is concerned both with linguistic representations and with 
how those representations are used in processing. All researchers, whether nominally 
psychologists or linguists, should seek to address both questions.  But in practice linguists 
have largely focused on representation and used a single method, acceptability judgments, to 
investigate it; whereas psychologists have not investigated representation but instead 
imported linguistic theories into their accounts.  In this paper, we argue instead that 
researchers need not, and should not, be restricted to acceptability judgments when 
investigating linguistic representation. 
This proposal is not new, but was previously just a theoretical possibility.  But it now appears 
that structural priming – the tendency to repeat linguistic structure across utterances – allows 
researchers to investigate linguistic representations in a way that has many advantages over 
acceptability judgments.  Most importantly, it has now reached maturity, in that there are 
hundreds of studies using this method and many of them are informative, not merely about 
language processing, but about linguistic representations themselves.  In fact, we argue that 
evidence from structural priming supports quite specific proposals about linguistic structure 
(relating to syntax and semantics), so that it can be used to develop linguistic theory and 
discriminate among competing accounts.  Thus the dominance of acceptability judgments can 
be ended, and the understanding of linguistic representation can develop to a greater extent 
than before. 
This paper describes our theoretical claims, linguistic account, and applications.  In Section 1, 
we motivate the use of structural priming to investigate mental representation and present the 
advantages of structural priming over acceptability judgments.  In Section 2, we consider 
what the extensive evidence using this method tells us about linguistic representation.  
Section 3 discusses the implications of our account. 
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1. Why a psychological account of linguistic structure is now possible 
A complete theory of human language requires characterization of both people’s linguistic 
representations and the processes that operate over those representations.  Thus issues of 
representation and processing are in principle of interest to both linguists and psychologists, 
albeit from different perspectives. In practice, however, linguistic representation (in particular 
with respect to syntactic and semantic structure) has for the last four decades largely been the 
domain of linguists and has primarily been studied using a single approach in which linguists 
or their informants make explicit metalinguistic judgments about the grammatical (or 
semantic) acceptability of individual sentences – henceforth, acceptability judgments. Such 
judgments constitute the dataset upon which theories of linguistic representation are based.  
In this paper, we propose that the representations underlying language use need not be, and in 
fact should not be, investigated only via such judgments. Rather, we suggest that they can be 
examined directly through a behavioral measure that has been used widely in psychological 
research to investigate the representation of a range of types of information.  This method is 
priming: If processing one stimulus affects the subsequent processing of another stimulus, 
then these stimuli share some aspect of their representation.  Hence, structural priming 
effects, where processing one utterance affects the processing of another utterance that shares 
an aspect of linguistic structure but is otherwise unrelated, provide evidence about linguistic 
representation.  In the classic demonstration, Bock (1986) had participants repeat active or 
passive sentences and then describe pictures depicting transitive events, and found that they 
were more likely to use a passive target sentence (e.g., the church is being struck by 
lightning) after repeating a passive prime sentence (the referee was punched by one of the 
fans) than after repeating an active (one of the fans punched the referee).  As subsequent 
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studies have demonstrated, these effects appear to arise from repetition of aspects of abstract 
linguistic structure and occur largely outside of awareness (Pickering & Ferreira, 2008).   
They cannot be explained in terms of repetition of particular words. Bock (1989) showed that 
participants tended to use ‘prepositional object’ (PO) dative sentences (The girl is handing a 
paintbrush to the man) rather than ‘double object’ (DO) sentences (The girl is handing the 
man a paintbrush) after a dative sentence that did not include to (The secretary baked the 
cake for her boss).  Hence priming could not be due to word repetition (because the PO and 
DO target sentences share all words except to).   
We can also rule out explanations couched entirely in terms of meaning. First, the alternative 
responses (e.g., PO and DO, or active and passive) denote the same events, in that they can 
both be used to describe the same picture.  Second, Messenger et al. (2012) found priming 
between sentences describing different event types (e.g., Experiencer-Theme: The king is 
being ignored by the bear, and Agent-Patient: The doctor gets licked by the cow). 
Additionally, Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000) found that Dutch participants repeated the 
order of auxiliary and main verb (was geblokkeerd; ‘was blocked’ vs. geblokkeerd was; 
‘blocked was’), even though they do not differ in meaning. Moreover, the effects cannot be 
explained by repetition of metrical structure, as The girl is handing a paintbrush to the man 
was not primed by Susan brought a book to study, though it was primed by the metrically 
equivalent Susan brought a book to Stella (Bock and Loebell 1990). Overall, these results are 
consistent with priming of representations that are specified for syntactic information but not 
semantic, lexical, or phonological information.  This conclusion is supported by studies 
showing priming of many other syntactic constructions, such as noun-phrase structure 
(Cleland and Pickering 2003) and verb-particle placement (Konopka and Bock 2009).  
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However, priming is also informative about other aspects of linguistic structure, including 
many components of semantics including thematic roles, quantification, and information 
structure. It occurs in diverse languages (e.g., English, Mandarin, Basque) and between 
languages, and in children, non-native speakers, amnesiacs and aphasics, and has been found 
using many experimental methods as well as in natural conversation (see Pickering and 
Ferreira 2008).   
It also occurs in comprehension, as indicated by choice of structure (e.g., Branigan, 
Pickering, and McLean 2005), reading time (e.g.,Traxler, Tooley, and Pickering 2014), 
predictive eye movements (Arai, van Gompel, and Scheepers 2007; Thothathiri and Snedeker 
2008a), event-related potentials (ERPs; Ledoux, Traxler, and Swaab 2007), and brain activity 
revealed by fMRI (Segaert et al. 2012).  Priming of comprehension usually involves 
participants selecting between analyses that have different meanings (e.g., high- or low-
attached prepositional phrases [PPs]; Branigan, Pickering, and McLean 2005), though 
experiments investigating predictions in ‘visual world’ paradigms and those using fMRI are 
exceptions.  When both meaning and syntax differ across conditions, it becomes much harder 
to relate any priming effects to linguistic representation. 
Importantly, structural priming occurs from comprehension to production (Branigan, 
Pickering, and Cleland 2000; Potter and Lombardi 1998) to a similar extent as within 
production (Bock et al. 2007; Tooley and Bock 2014), and it occurs from production to 
comprehension to a similar extent as within comprehension (Branigan, Pickering, and 
McLean 2005). Moreover, studies of priming effects within comprehension, within 
production, and between production and comprehension implicate common neural 
architectures (Menenti et al. 2011; Segaert et al. 2012; Segaert et al. 2013). These findings 
are particularly important for justifying the relevance of priming to representation. We 
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therefore believe we can use structural priming effects to develop a psychologically 
motivated theory of syntactic representation and the way in which it relates to semantic 
representation. But before sketching this account in Section 2, we need to justify why such an 
account is possible in principle.   
1.1 The reality of linguistic representation  
The nature of linguistic representation is of fundamental interest for experimental 
psychologists who are concerned with language, because people must represent linguistic 
structure in order to use language. Psychological theories of language must therefore specify 
the representations that speakers and hearers use, as well as the processes that operate over 
those representations, in the same way that theories of visual cognition specify the 
representations that perceivers construct as they interpret scenes (Biederman 1987). 
Understanding the nature of linguistic representation has also been the central goal of most 
theoretical linguistics, at least since the publication of Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957).  
Linguists have attempted to provide grammars for natural languages (i.e., precise descriptions 
of the relationships that may hold between linguistic expressions). Some linguists view such 
grammars as characterizations of essentially ‘platonic’ objects that have nothing to do with 
the human mind (e.g., Katz 1981; see also Langendoen and Postal 1984). Any such ‘platonic’ 
linguistics is not our concern. But for most linguists, grammars are envisaged as the 
knowledge that underlies speakers’/hearers’ use of language: “…linguistics is that branch of 
psychology that focuses its attention on one specific cognitive domain and one faculty of 
mind, the language faculty” (Chomsky 1980, 4), and its primary aim is to construct a 
grammar that is psychologically real, in the sense that “…the grammar corresponds to the 
speaker’s internal representation of that domain” (Bresnan and Kaplan 1982, xxiii).  Our 
concern is the nature of this internal representation.   
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But among linguists there are different views on the relationship between this representation 
and language processing (see Lewis and Phillips 2015). One possibility is that the grammar is 
drawn upon directly during processing. This is clearly the simplest approach, requiring the 
fewest additional assumptions. Under this approach, evidence about the representations that 
are involved in language processing is clearly relevant to linguistic theory – ‘linguistic’ and 
‘psycholinguistic’ representations would be the same. (Any discrepancies between evidence 
from processing and acceptability judgments would be due to factors such as processing 
limitations that are explicable in terms of generally accepted cognitive assumptions; Lewis 
and Phillips 2015.) 
Other linguists assume that the grammar is not used directly in processing, in other words that 
the grammar and the language processing system form two distinct systems. For these 
researchers, processing is assumed to involve linguistic representations, but the nature of 
those representations need not constrain their theories.  The kinds of theory that might 
involve two systems of this kind might include theories that specify a form of ‘universal 
grammar’ that is available early in development and inputs into the grammars of specific 
languages but does not continue to be represented later in development (e.g., Clahsen and 
Muysken 1986), or theories in which underlying representations are compiled into different 
representations that are used during processing ‘on-line’ (e.g., Berwick and Weinberg 1984; 
Fodor 1983). Moreover, linguistically motivated theories tend to seek to describe the 
language using as parsimonious a representational system as possible (e.g., Chomsky 1995), 
an approach that will not necessarily be compatible with the representations used in language 
processing (e.g., Croft 2001; Jackendoff 2002).   
But in all such cases, the representations that are used by the processor remain an object of 
enquiry that critically pertains to the speaker’s internal representation of the linguistic domain 
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(and any theory that assumes two systems of representation must explain how the two 
systems are related).  Our goal is to consider alternative (experimental) methods to 
acceptability judgments that potentially address the linguistic representations that are 
implicated in language processing. Evidence from such methods cannot disprove the 
existence of other representations. But a theory that does not assume inaccessible 
representations is more parsimonious than one that does, and if the two representational 
systems are assumed only because of apparent incompatibility between acceptability 
judgment and processing data, then it is preferable to assume a single representation, and that 
different methods tap into the same representation in slightly different ways (see Lewis and 
Phillips 2015).  
We therefore assume – in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary – that there is a 
single representational system for language structure, which is implicated during language 
processing, and that people do not have other (inaccessible) mental representations of 
language structure. If any such representations were to exist, they would clearly be of 
interest. But they do not form part of our account, and it is for theories that propose such 
representations to motivate them and to specify the mapping between them and those used in 
processing.  
To characterize the knowledge that speakers and hearers draw on, researchers from both 
experimental psychological and theoretical linguistic backgrounds might in principle use 
evidence from many different sources, including judgments of grammaticality and meaning, 
and evidence from language acquisition and ‘perceptual experiments’ (Chomsky 1965, 37).  
However, Chomsky is unconvinced by the use of processing evidence to investigate linguistic 
representation. In an important footnote, he says that “One common fallacy is to assume that 
if some experimental result provides counter-evidence to a theory of processing that includes 
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a grammatical theory T and parsing procedure P…, then it is T that is challenged and must be 
changed. The conclusion is particularly unreasonable in the light of the fact that in general 
there is independent (so-called ‘linguistic’) evidence in support of T while there is no reason 
at all to believe that P is true” (Chomsky 1981, 283, footnote 39.) This provides a 
justification for ignoring experimental data.  And in practice, most linguists have adopted this 
approach. They have therefore tended to base their theories (particularly of syntax) primarily 
on evidence from acceptability judgments, and in particular have tended to ignore 
psychological data suggesting that people process sentences using representations that differ 
from those proposed by linguists (see Fodor, Bever, and Garrett 1974; Wasow and Arnold 
2005). 
1.2 Why acceptability judgments are not enough 
Acceptability judgments involve native speakers of a language deciding whether sentences 
are acceptable or unacceptable.  Traditionally, linguists who investigate whether sentences 
are grammatical or not usually refer to them as grammaticality judgments: Sentences judged 
grammatical should be licensed by the grammar; sentences that are judged ungrammatical 
should not be licensed by the grammar. Acceptability judgments are a convenient source of 
data, since all that is required is a native speaker. They can provide evidence about the set of 
possible sentences that comprise a language, and are also assumed to give evidence 
concerning the structure of speakers’ internalized knowledge of language (e.g., Chomsky 
1986). Acceptability judgments have historically provided a fertile source of evidence for 
hypotheses about the nature of linguistic representation. But they pose many concerns.  
Some are surmountable, and relate to how they have typically been used (e.g., Gibson and 
Fedorenko 2013).  For example, linguists standardly ask a single informant about the 
acceptability of a few sentences.  But it is possible to conduct acceptability judgments as a 
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well-controlled psycholinguistic experiment, using many (varied) sentences, using naïve 
participants, controlling for plausibility, and randomizing presentation order. It is also 
possible to control for effects of previous exposure or judgments (sentences appearing more 
or less acceptable when the construction is repeated; e.g., Levelt 1972; Luka and Barsalou 
2005; Snyder 2000) – a phenomenon which is presumably related to structural priming. 
Next, acceptability judgments face the problems associated with any explicit task.  The 
informant’s judgments may reflect decision-making biases. This concern is exacerbated when 
the informant is the researcher, or has knowledge of the theoretical questions under 
investigation. Moreover, the informant may not interpret terms such as grammatical or 
acceptable as the linguist intends. To all of these concerns, linguists may respond that 
traditional methods are adequate as they have not led to many errors (e.g., Sprouse, Schütze, 
and Almeida 2013) and because native-speaker linguists can immediately detect erroneous 
judgments that are used in theory-building (e.g., Phillips 2009), but controversy remains. 
But acceptability judgments face more fundamental problems.  Most obviously, they can only 
be used to study linguistic representations in certain populations, as they can only be elicited 
from speakers who are capable of making metalinguistic judgments. For example, they 
cannot be used with children younger than three (nor indeed with many three-year-olds;  
Ambridge and Rowland 2013; McDaniel and Smith Cairns 1998).  Hence, acceptability 
judgments cannot be used to address some fundamental representational questions. 
Another  far-reaching problem is source ambiguity (Hofmeister et al. 2013). There is no 
reason to believe that acceptability judgments offer privileged access to linguistic 
representation in a way that other methods do not.  Acceptability judgments are the results of 
linguistic and cognitive processes, by which people attempt to process sentences and then 
make metalinguistic judgments on the results of those acts of processing (e.g., someone 
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cannot understand a sentence or finds it jarring, therefore assumes it is unacceptable).  Thus 
they implicate the same linguistic representations that are involved in all acts of processing. It 
is therefore not possible to tell whether any judgment of unacceptability reflects 
ungrammaticality, low probability, or unprocessability.  For example, Bresnan (2007) found 
that acceptability judgments for sentences were affected by those sentences’ probability of 
occurrence. Equally, people often judge center-embedded sentences (e.g., the rat that the cat 
that the dog bit chased fled) as unacceptable, yet most theorists follow Chomsky (1965) in 
assuming they are grammatical and that people’s judgments reflect processing difficulty. 
Similarly, garden-path sentences (e.g., the horse raced past the barn fell) are often judged 
unacceptable, yet most theorists assume that this is because people initially misanalyze them 
and fail to recover (Bever, 1970). In these cases, linguists might argue that there are clear 
explanations for why they are judged unacceptable (complexity, confusability, ambiguity).   
But in other cases, the explanation for why a sentence is unacceptable is more contentious, 
for example whether the unacceptability of What did who visit? reflects a syntactic violation 
(Chomsky 1995) or processing difficulty (Hofmeister et al. 2013). Conversely, linguists 
sometimes argue that acceptable sentences are not grammatical (e.g., It was I; Sobin 1997).  
In this respect, acceptability judgments are susceptible to the same challenges as processing 
data: The data are compatible with particular grammar-processor pairings, not just with 
particular grammars.  An explanation of which sentences are acceptable and which are not 
therefore seems to require a theory of processing alongside a theory of grammaticality. 
A more fundamental problem is that even if it could somehow be determined that a particular 
set of acceptability judgments indexed grammaticality, such judgments directly determine 
only set membership. That is, they determine weak generative capacity: which sentences are 
members of the set of sentences licensed by a grammar, and which sentences are not.
1
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However, they cannot by themselves determine linguistic structure. To draw inferences about 
linguistic structure, they need to be combined with tests about constituency. 
But as widely acknowledged, constituency structure tests are inconsistent and problematic in 
many ways. Textbooks introducing such tests standardly warn that they produce 
contradictory results.  To give some examples: Coordination tests support the existence of 
constituents (e.g., an NP-NP constituent in The woman gave the child a cake and the dog a 
bone) that other tests such as topicalization and it-cleft do not (and in this case most linguistic 
theories ignore the coordination test). Ellipsis and question-short answer tests may support 
constituents (e.g., baked a cake in I said he baked a cake and in fact he did so/What did he 
do? Baked a cake) when topicalization and it-cleft tests do not (*I said he baked a cake and 
baked a cake he/*It is baked a cake that he). Ellipsis tests yield obviously problematic results 
(e.g., China is a country Tom wants to visit, and he will if he gets the money suggests that 
China…visit is a constituent; Kempson, Meyer-Viol, and Gabbay 1999).  These are not 
unusual or isolated examples, and even the most basic assumptions about constituency (e.g., 
the structure of simple transitive sentences) show different results for different tests.  
Moreover, the basic rationale for why these specific tests should tap constituent structure 
remains unclear (Berg 2009). In fact, it has been proposed that they are more appropriately 
considered as structural heuristics rather than structural diagnostics (Payne 2006). 
Most importantly, the use of acceptability judgments, with or without the application of 
constituency tests, has yielded no consensus at all about linguistic representation. For 
example, theories associated with the transformational tradition (i.e., following accounts such 
as Chomsky 1981; Chomsky 1995) assume syntactic representations of considerable 
complexity, including many more branching nodes than words, a large number of empty 
categories, and extensive movement of constituents. Such representations can be interpreted 
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as involving many syntactic levels (if movement is interpreted as taking place in stages) and 
associations between the syntactic representations and other representations such as LF and 
PF, which themselves input into meaning and sound. These theories also make broad 
assumptions such as binary branching.  In contrast, theories such as Head-Driven Phrase 
Structure Grammar (HPSG; Pollard and Sag 1994) make very different assumptions, with 
simpler, flatter trees, and few if any empty categories. Some theories assume grammatical 
functions play a central role (e.g., Lexical-Functional Grammar [LFG]; Kaplan and Bresnan 
1982), whereas others do not.  Other theories assign a key role to ‘constructions’ (e.g., 
Goldberg 1995) or allow overlapping constituents (e.g., Steedman, 2000). Additionally there 
is little agreement about whether there is a clear distinction between syntactic and lexical 
information, or whether most syntactic information is stored alongside lexical items. 
Acceptability judgments have not been able to adjudicate between these alternatives, except 
insofar as one set of rules or constraints that can generate the same set of sentences is “better” 
by some metric such as parsimony or learnability (and even on these grounds, there is 
disagreement). 
In sum, acceptability judgments have been more successful in inspiring accounts of linguistic 
representation than in discriminating among those accounts. They have inherent and 
fundamental limitations, because judgments can easily be influenced by non-linguistic 
factors, they cannot be used at all with some populations, and most importantly they do not 
provide direct evidence about structure. Given these concerns, researchers concerned with 
linguistic representations should not rely solely on such judgments, and should call on 
additional methodologies that are directly sensitive to structure and that avoid the limitations 
discussed above.  
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1.3 Psycholinguistic approaches to linguistic representation 
Is there a different approach to linguistic representation that is based more directly on 
psycholinguistic methods?  Researchers have intermittently proposed that some form of 
experimental method may be informative about linguistic representation (and not merely 
processing). In the 1960s, psychologists attempted to relate processing difficulty to linguistic 
complexity (e.g., number of transformations; Chomsky 1965) using reaction time measures 
(McMahon 1963; Miller and McKean 1964; Miller 1962).  But it proved very difficult to 
control for other potentially relevant factors.  For example, a passive might take longer to 
process than an active because a passive involves an additional transformation (hence greater 
representational complexity), or alternatively because of length, word frequency, local or 
global ambiguity, and so on.  
Other experimental studies tested for the existence of empty categories, as assumed by some 
linguistic theories (e.g., Chomsky 1981) but not others. McElree and Bever (1989) found that 
people were faster to decide whether a critical phrase had occurred in a sentence if an empty 
category (or ‘gap’) corresponding to the phrase occurred at the end of the sentence than if the 
sentence had no empty category. They argued that comprehenders reactivated the empty 
category at its location, and hence that empty elements are mentally represented (see also 
Nicol and Swinney 1989). But these results do not require empty categories and may instead 
be due to semantic processes. Pickering and Barry (1991) accordingly argued against the 
representation of empty categories in sentences such as In which pot did you put the cup?, 
because people appear to relate in which pot to the verb put as soon as they reach the verb 
(Sag and Fodor 1994; Traxler and Pickering 1996).  But Gibson and Hickok (1993) proposed 
an account of their data in which people ‘project’ (i.e., predict) an empty category when they 
reach the verb.  In accord with Chomsky (1981), Pickering and Barry’s data can be explained 
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by either a bottom-up parser (Parsing procedure P1) using a grammar without empty 
categories (Grammatical Theory T1), or a top-down parser (P2) using a grammar with empty 
categories (T2).  More recent attempts to use processing evidence to adjudicate among 
competing linguistic theories of ellipsis, quantification, and scalar implicature have faced 
analogous problems (Lewis and Phillips 2015).   
Other types of experimental work are in principle relevant to linguistic representation, but do 
not provide the basis for a general methodology for understanding linguistic representation.  
Sprouse, Wagers, and Phillips (2012) found that the acceptability of sentences violating 
island constraints (e.g., *What do you wonder whether John bought?) is unrelated to 
measures of working-memory capacity, and therefore argued that such island constraints are 
likely to constitute part of grammar.  Such research may constrain linguistic theories, but 
relates to quite specific phenomena. Some researchers have used patterns of agreement errors 
(the road to the islands; e.g., Bock and Miller 1991) to draw conclusions supporting 
linguistic frameworks incorporating movement and empty categories (Franck et al. 2010), but 
others assume that they are informative about processing mechanisms (e.g., the scope of 
utterance planning; Gillespie and Pearlmutter 2013). Research that uses young children’s 
errors to infer their underlying representations runs into the same problem of distinguishing 
representational from processing explanations (Ambridge and Rowland 2013). Studies using 
ERPs show different signatures for implausible versus ungrammatical sentences (e.g., Kutas 
and Hillyard 1980;  Osterhout and Holcomb 1992), but it is unclear whether there is a 
specifically semantic or syntactic component in the ERP wave-form (e.g., Kim and Osterhout 
2005; Nieuwland, Martin, and Carreiras 2013).  Likewise, fMRI studies do not 
unambiguously identify brain regions that are associated with particular levels of linguistic 
representation (Price 2010).   
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In fact, most psychologists of language have largely shied away from making claims about 
linguistic representation, and instead adopt the representations proposed by linguists.  A 
classic example is Frazier 's (1987) Garden-Path theory, which assumes that comprehenders 
initially select the syntactically simpler analysis of an ambiguous utterance.  The theory 
makes specific syntactic assumptions (e.g., ternary branching structure is possible), which 
affect its predictions.  But experiments concerned with the theory (e.g., Frazier and Rayner 
1982) have not attempted to test whether these assumptions are correct. Many alternative 
accounts of parsing are, if anything, even less tempted to encroach on the territory of 
linguistic representation (e.g., MacDonald, Pearlmutter, and Seidenberg 1994).   
In sum, linguists and psychologists agree that linguistic structure is mentally represented.  
But acceptability judgments are an imperfect and limited way of investigating such 
representations, and psychological approaches have not provided a general method for 
investigating linguistic representation.  However, we now propose that structural priming is a 
very promising method that can be used systematically to address many linguistic questions. 
1.4 Can structural priming be used to investigate linguistic representation? 
Priming effects occur when processing a stimulus with particular characteristics affects 
subsequent processing of another stimulus with the same or related characteristics (Schacter 
1987). Such effects are found pervasively throughout cognition. In visual perception, for 
example, object recognition can be facilitated by previous exposure to a stimulus with shared 
visual features (Biederman and Cooper 1991). Psychologists use such effects to investigate 
the nature of underlying representations. The logic underlying priming methodologies is that 
exposure to a prime stimulus facilitates (or inhibits) particular representations, making them 
more (or less) amenable to subsequent re-use if they can be applied to a subsequent target 
stimulus.
2
 If processing of a stimulus A is affected by prior processing of B to a greater extent 
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than by prior processing of C, then the representation underlying A is more similar to the 
representation underlying B than it is to the representation underlying C. By careful 
investigation, we can determine how A and B are related, and use this relationship to inform a 
general theory of representation. For example, Biederman and Cooper manipulated the extent 
to which prime and target stimuli shared visual attributes such as vertices and 
convex/concave components, and used their results to propose a theory of visual object 
representation.  
Such effects provide an implicit measure of representation that is independent of any explicit 
response (e.g., regarding well-formedness, presence of particular characteristics, similarity). 
They occur without awareness or explicit recall of the prime stimulus, and are generally 
believed to be automatic and resource-free (e.g., Dehaene et al. 1998; Forster and Davis 
1984). In other words, priming effects arguably implicate a direct relationship between 
representation and behavior.   
Priming paradigms have been extensively applied to language. For example, participants are 
faster at judging that a target stimulus is a word (e.g., nurse) if they have just responded to a 
semantically (or associatively) related prime word (doctor) than an unrelated word (table; 
Meyer and Schvaneveldt 1971). By manipulating the relationship between prime and target, 
researchers have constructed detailed models of the psychological representation of lexical 
entries (McNamara 2005). Accordingly, Marslen-Wilson et al. (1994) used evidence of 
priming between words that shared a semantically transparent stem (e.g., observation-
observant), but not between words that had a common historical derivation but did not share 
a semantically transparent stem (e.g., apart-apartment), to argue that the former had a 
decomposable (bi-morphemic) representation whereas the latter did not. They noted that this 
psychological evidence contrasted with theoretical and historical linguistic analyses. 
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We argue that priming can similarly be used to investigate the representation of any aspect of 
linguistic structure. Thus we could demonstrate changes in some aspect of behavior (e.g., 
likelihood of a particular response, response time, patterns of brain activity) following a 
sentence with particular characteristics, and draw inferences about the representations that 
underlie the prime and target, without requiring participants to make any explicit judgment.  
Experiments using structural priming paradigms avoid many problems typically associated 
with acceptability judgments. They standardly use many sentences and many naïve 
participants, control for plausibility differences and effects of previous exposure, and 
randomize presentation order (though we have noted that these controls can be applied to 
acceptability judgments). Because they use implicit behavioral measures, they can avoid 
decision-making biases and problems about informants’ interpretation of acceptable and 
unacceptable (or grammatical and ungrammatical). For the same reason, they can be used to 
investigate representations in participants who cannot make appropriate metalinguistic 
judgments, or who are indeed unable to make any explicit response, for instance young 
children or language-impaired patients. Furthermore, because priming is based on the 
processor recognizing that two utterances are related, such experiments provide evidence that 
goes beyond set membership.  Finally, investigations of priming between comprehension and 
production are directly informative about representation (rather than aspects of processing 
that are specific to production or comprehension).
3
 
A possible concern is that priming between two sentences may tap into a level of 
representation that is distinct from another linguistic representation that is inaccessible to 
priming (e.g., a ‘deep structure’ as in Chomsky 1965). But as stated above, our goal is to 
characterize the linguistic representations that are implicated in language use (and we have 
argued against inaccessible representations; Section 1.1). And of course any such objection 
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equally applies to the use of acceptability judgments, which also involve processing, and 
might also fail to access such representations.  
Another concern is identifying which aspect of structure priming taps into. For example, 
speakers might tend to repeat POs or DOs (Bock, 1986) because they are primed to repeat 
syntactic structure, or because they are primed to repeat aspects of meaning, thematic role 
order (e.g., Theme-Recipient vs. Recipient-Theme), or order of animate/inanimate entitities, 
among other possibilities.  In some cases, it is possible to exclude alternative explanations 
within an experiment.  In other cases, we should seek converging evidence across 
experiments, whereby alternative explanations are systematically ruled out (as has been done 
for POs/DOs; see Sections 1.0 and 2).  
A different concern is that structural priming may itself be susceptible to processing 
influences. Obviously it may not be sensitive to linguistic relationships under all conditions, 
for example if the target occurs too long after the prime.  Participants may also sometimes 
fail to demonstrate priming because of processing limitations (e.g., children may sometimes 
be unable to produce complex structures, despite having the relevant linguistic 
representations). For these participants, it may be important to use priming paradigms that 
minimize processing requirements or do not require an overt response (e.g., using ERPs and 
fMRI; Ledoux, Traxler, and Swaab 2007; Segaert et al. 2012).  
A more serious problem would occur if an effect that mimicked structural priming arose for 
reasons that are not informative about linguistic representation.  In the case of acceptability 
judgments and when using comprehension data (e.g., reading times), we have noted that 
conclusions about linguistic representation (i.e., T) might depend on assumptions about 
processing (i.e., P). But it is hard to see how the explanation of priming could depend on 
processing assumptions.   
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Priming could also occur for reasons other than similarity of linguistic representation.  For 
example, comprehending a garden-path sentence might be easier following another, unrelated 
garden-path sentence, because comprehenders are primed to adopt more complex or less 
frequent analyses. Equally, speakers might be more likely to produce a rare (or less felicitous) 
structure after encountering another rare (or less felicitous) structure.  But such effects should 
be more general than effects due to structural priming, and could be distinguished with 
careful experimentation.  
A final concern is that most demonstrations of priming in production relate to choices 
between sentence forms, and so rely on the existence of structural alternatives – it is hard to 
use priming in production to investigate the representation of sentences where no relevant 
alternative exists, or where one alternative is highly infrequent or infelicitous. But this simply 
means that priming in production cannot be used to investigate all structures. On some 
occasions, priming in comprehension may present an alternative. 
1.5 Summary 
There has been an historical division between a theoretical linguistic focus on representation 
and a psychological focus on processing. Research on representation has relied almost 
exclusively on acceptability judgments, which have provided a fertile source of data for 
developing hypotheses, but have many limitations and do not provide unambiguous 
diagnostics that can discriminate among alternative hypotheses. Most methods grounded in 
psychology (or neuroscience) have not themselves provided such diagnostics.  However, we 
have argued that structural priming is different: It provides evidence that is directly 
informative about mental representation.  
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We propose that acceptability judgments can be used (with appropriate controls) alongside 
structural priming (and perhaps other experimental methods; see Section 1.3) as a means of 
developing representational hypotheses.
4
  But they should not be the final arbiters for 
discriminating among hypotheses. Instead, researchers should where possible use structural 
priming to test hypotheses. In many cases, evidence from structural priming will converge 
with evidence from acceptability judgments, and hence provide strong support for specific 
representational claims. In other cases, priming evidence will adjudicate between competing 
linguistic accounts (whether different analyses of the same construction within the same 
broad linguistic framework, or analyses that are based on very different linguistic 
assumptions). But where acceptability judgment and priming evidence do not converge, 
evidence from priming should be favored, especially when acceptability judgments do not 
produce clear evidence.   
We have made this argument in principle. But we suggest that there is now sufficient 
evidence from structural priming experiments to outline a psychologically motivated account 
of syntactic aspects of linguistic representation, and their relationship to semantics and the 
lexicon. We base this account on specific structural priming findings, but argue that it is also 
compatible with traditional linguistic evidence and that it discriminates among theories based 
on such evidence.  
2. An outline theory of syntax and its interfaces based on structural priming 
To explain our account, we consider the representation of A book was begun by every 
linguist, under an interpretation in which each linguist began writing a (possibly) different 
book. We focus on information that appears relevant to syntactic representation (either as part 
of the syntactic representation itself, or by interfacing with the syntactic representation).  
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First, people must represent semantic information (roughly corresponding to the speaker's 
intended 'message'; Levelt, 1989). Importantly, this includes propositions represented in 
terms of predicates and their arguments. In our example, one proposition encodes a complex 
event structure involving the initiation of an event of writing.  This writing event is associated 
with two thematic roles: an Agent that undertakes the act of writing, and a Theme that is 
written. The Agent of the writing act is also the Agent who initiates this act.  There is also 
quantificational information that every linguist has wider scope than a book, and information 
structure specifying that a book is emphasized.   
We also assume that people represent syntactic and lexical information about the words that 
are used and how they are arranged. Thus, people represent that the sentence includes the 
words a and book, in that order, as well as information about larger units of structure (e.g., 
that a and book form a constituent).  Importantly, elements expressed in the message may not 
always straightforwardly correspond to elements expressed in the syntax and to lexical 
content (e.g., there is no word expressing the writing event; cf. Jackendoff 2002b).  Finally, 
people represent the relationship between these different types of information and sound 
(phonology, intonation, etc.).   
Our account has the following basic properties (see Figure 1). It distinguishes representations 
specifying semantics from those specifying syntax. There is a single semantic level of 
representation that encodes information about quantificational scope relations, information 
structure, and thematic structure, including ‘missing’ elements (i.e., elements that do not 
correspond to an element that is uttered). There is a single syntactic level of representation 
that draws on well-formedness constraints (or ‘rules’) specifying local relations with respect 
to linear order as well as hierarchical relations. The syntactic level of representation includes 
syntactic category information, but not semantic information (e.g., thematic roles) or lexical 
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content. There is no syntactic movement, but some elements that are not uttered are 
represented in the syntax. The syntactic level is separate from a single sound-based level of 
representation that encodes phonology, syllabic structure, and metrical information (which 
we refer to under the blanket term ‘phonological information’). We assume one sound-based 
level as there is insufficient evidence to discriminate different levels (see Sevald, Dell, and 
Cole 1995; Tooley, Konopka, and Watson 2014). 
2.1 Syntactic representation 
We begin by motivating the syntactic level of representation, as this is the level for which 
there is most evidence from priming. Our account assumes a single level of syntax that 
includes constituent structure. There are no separate levels containing, for example, reordered 
constituents (e.g., Deep Structure) or unordered constituents (e.g., incorporating hierarchical 
structure but not linear order).  In addition, this level does not incorporate quantificational 
information (which instead forms part of the semantic representation). 
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First, syntactic representations do not contain semantic information. This claim is supported 
by evidence of priming between sentences involving different types of event, predicates, and 
entities. Bock and Loebell (1990) found that intransitive active sentences with a by-phrase 
expressing a location (The foreigner was loitering by the broken traffic light) primed 
transitive passive sentences where the by-phrase expressed an Agent (The boy was woken by 
an alarm clock), and Messenger et al. (2012) showed priming between passive sentences that 
involved different thematic roles (e.g., The girl is being scared by the pig and The king is 
being ignored by the bear both primed The doctor gets licked by the cow); as we discuss 
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below, these results cannot be explained by closed-class word repetition (see also Bock 
1989). Both studies found the same magnitude of priming when primes and targets did not 
involve the same thematic roles as when they did.  
Additionally, priming occurs when the alternatives involve no discernible semantic 
difference. Hartsuiker and Westenberg (2000)  found structural priming for the order of the 
auxiliary and main verb in Dutch, even though they involve the same words and do not 
express different meanings. Konopka and Bock (2009) similarly showed priming for the 
position of the particle in meaning-identical sentences involving phrasal verbs (e.g., pulled 
the sweater off vs. pulled off the sweater). Ferreira (2003) found priming for the presence 
versus absence of the complementizer that (e.g., the mechanic mentioned the car could use a 
tune-up vs. the mechanic mentioned that the car could use a tune-up).  
These studies also demonstrate that the relevant representations are not intrinsically bound to 
open-class lexical content: Priming occurs between sentences that share no such content. Nor 
are they bound to closed-class content (e.g., The secretary baked a cake for her boss and The 
secretary brought a cake to her boss primed The girl is giving a paintbrush to the man to the 
same extent; Bock 1989;  see also Pickering and Branigan 1998).  Other experiments show 
structural priming between sentences containing a mismatch between syntactic structure and 
the verb’s subcategorization requirements (e.g., The waitress exists the book to the monk 
primes PO responses; Ivanova, Pickering, Branigan, et al. 2012; see also Ivanova, Pickering, 
McLean, et al. 2012) – if syntactic representations were bound to lexical content, priming 
should have occurred only when the syntactic properties of the words were compatible with 
the sentence structure.  
The finding that priming occurs between sentences with different phonological content (e.g., 
for-to in Bock, 1989; was showing-showed; Pickering & Branigan, 1998) to the same extent 
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as priming between sentences with the same phonological content (to-to; showed-showed) 
also implies that syntactic representations do not contain word-level phonological 
information. Additionally, Bock and Loebell (1990) showed that priming did not occur based 
on metrical structure (e.g., Susan bought a book for Susan primed POs, but Susan brought a 
book to study did not).  
Hence priming evidence supports the existence of abstract syntactic representations. It also 
suggests that these are ‘shallow’ and monostratal, in a way that corresponds at least roughly 
to the assumptions of Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) and many other non-transformational 
theories (e.g., Gazdar et al. 1985; Goldberg 1995; Pollard and Sag 1994; Steedman 2000).  It 
does not support a second, underlying level of syntactic structure, or the syntactic 
representation of empty categories associated with the movement of constituents in some 
transformational analyses.  Thus, Bock and Loebell’s (1990) finding of priming from 
intransitive (active) locatives to passives implies that these structures share syntactic 
representations, which we take to be noun phrase (NP; the foreigner, the boy), verb 
(including auxiliary; was loitering, was woken), and PP (by the broken traffic light, by an 
alarm clock).  Our account contrasts with many syntactocentric linguistic theories, which 
assume distinct syntactic representations for passives and intransitive locatives.  Specifically, 
transformational accounts assume that the passive involves an empty category associated 
with the subject (the boy) immediately after the verb (woken), whereas intransitive locatives 
do not involve an empty category.  Converging evidence supporting our account comes from 
Flett's (2006) finding that Spanish speakers tended to repeat the order of the subject and verb 
in unaccusative sentences to the same extent following unergative and unaccusative primes, 
which transformational accounts assume involve distinct syntactic representations (with 
unaccusatives but not unergatives involving subject movement and an associated empty 
category). 
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Similarly, priming from transitive locatives to POs implies that these constructions share 
syntactic representations (Bock and Loebell 1990), whereas many transformational accounts 
assume that they have different structures, with the PP appearing as a sister to the verb node 
in POs (because it is a complement) but as a sister to a higher V’ node in locatives (because it 
is an adjunct). The only accounts in which POs and transitive locatives have the same 
representation are where the structure is shallow and simple, in the sense that there are nodes 
for the verb, NP, and PP, but nothing else. Likewise, Wittenberg (2014) found (bidirectional) 
priming between POs/DOs and ‘light verb’ sentences (e.g., The kidnapper gives the 
government an ultimatum/an ultimatum to the government), whereas transformational 
accounts assume distinct representations, with POs/DOs – unlike light verb sentences – 
involving a V-trace (Hale and Keyser 1993; Hale and Keyser 2002; see Wittenberg et al. 
2014). 
Syntactic representations are also monostratal in the sense that they represent hierarchical and 
linear relations simultaneously. Pickering, Branigan, and McLean (2002) showed that 
sentences involving the same hierarchical relations but different linear relations did not prime 
each other. Participants were no more likely to produce a PO (involving V NP PP order) 
following a ‘shifted’ PO (the same constituents in V PP NP order; e.g., The racing driver 
showed to the helpful mechanic the damaged wheel) than following an intransitive sentence. 
Pappert and Pechmann (2014) found similar results in German, where the shifted order is 
much less unusual.  
The syntactic representations capture ‘local’ relationships between a ‘mother’ and its 
constituent ‘daughter(s)’ (e.g., a VP comprising a verb and two NPs), independent of the 
larger context in which the phrase appears (e.g., that the VP occurs within a subordinate 
clause), or the internal structure of the sub-phrases that constitute it (e.g., that the first NP 
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comprises a determiner, adjective, and noun).
5
 This assumption is consistent with any 
approach to grammar that distinguishes within- and between-phrasal relations, such as 
context-free grammars with maximal projections. It is motivated by evidence that priming 
occurs between sentences that share local structure but differ at other levels. Branigan et al. 
(2006) found priming when the prime involved a DO or PO structure in a main clause (e.g., 
The racing driver showed the helpful mechanic the flat tyre) and the target involved a 
subordinate clause (e.g., The rumours alleged that the patient showed the doctor his scar), 
and vice versa. In fact, priming occurred to the same extent whether the prime and target 
involved the same or different clause types, implying that the same representations were 
involved whenever a DO or PO structure was used, irrespective of the larger context (see also 
Melinger and Cleland 2011). 
Likewise, priming occurs between sentences that differ in detailed structure (i.e., 
constituents’ internal structure). Pickering and Branigan (1998) found PO/DO priming when 
the internal structure of complement NPs differed between prime and target (e.g., omission or 
inclusion of adjectives: The racing driver showed the torn overall to the manager primed The 
patient showed his spots to the doctor). Moreover, Fox Tree and Meijer (1999) found 
equivalent priming for POs and DOs whether the VPs in prime and target had the same 
internal structure (i.e., both included or did not include a subordinate relative clause) or 
different internal structure (i.e., one involved a subordinate relative clause and the other did 
not). This finding also demonstrates that priming is not based on a sequence of phrasal 
categories (i.e., without hierarchical structure). 
Finally, traditional theories of language production make reference to grammatical functions 
such as subject (e.g., Garrett 1975), for example assuming that they have their own ‘deep’ 
level of representation (corresponding roughly to F-structure in LFG; Kaplan and Bresnan 
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1982) that is independent of constituent structure.  Many linguistic theories also assume some 
form of representation of grammatical functions, even those that attempt to develop 
monostratal syntax (see Culicover and Jackendoff 2005, 152, 538). For John loves Mary, 
speakers might compute < JohnSUBJECT , MaryDIRECT-OBJECT , loves > as an unordered 
representation separate from [NP John] [VP [V loves] [NP Mary]].  Such a representation would 
be incompatible with our assumption of a single syntactic level.   
Some priming studies have been interpreted in terms of grammatical functions (see section 
2.4).  Bock, Loebell, and Morey (1992) argued that speakers repeat mappings of animacy 
features (encoded in semantic representations) to grammatical functions (e.g., inanimate to 
subject). But participants might also have repeated mappings of animacy features to word-
order positions (e.g., inanimate to first NP). Chang, Bock, and Goldberg (2003) reported 
priming effects that could have reflected a tendency to repeatedly assign thematic roles (e.g., 
Location) to grammatical functions (e.g., direct object) or to word-order positions (e.g., 
immediately following the verb). Cai, Pickering, and Branigan (2012) found some evidence 
(in Mandarin) for separate priming from thematic roles to grammatical functions and from 
thematic roles to word-order positions, and argued that grammatical functions should be 
incorporated into the constituent structure representation (e.g., [NP JohnSUBJECT] [VP [V loves] 
[NP MaryDIRECT-OBJECT]]).  However, priming has not resolved the status of grammatical 
functions (and we therefore do not incorporate them into Figure 1). 
2.1.1 ‘Missing’ elements  
We have argued that priming evidence does not support the existence of empty categories 
associated with the movement of NPs or verbs in syntactic structure, and have proposed a 
monostratal account (involving a single level of syntax that is linked to a single level of 
semantics and a single level of phonology). But within this account, some elements that are 
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not phonologically represented may be syntactically represented. In fact, priming may allow 
us to determine cases where missing elements are syntactically represented and cases where 
they are not.  More generally, priming potentially allows us to address the syntactic 
representation of sentences in which the semantics and phonology are misaligned: Does the 
syntax align with the former or the latter?   
We first consider ellipsis. Syntactic accounts of ellipsis assume that elided elements are 
represented syntactically (as well as semantically; e.g., Hankamer 1979; Merchant 2001); 
semantic accounts assume that they are represented semantically but not syntactically (e.g., 
Fiengo and May 1994).  Consider The charity needed support so the man gave some money, 
in which the semantic representation specifies the Agent (the man), Theme (some money), 
and Recipient (the charity), whereas the phonological representation specifies the Agent and 
Theme but not the Recipient.  According to syntactic accounts, the syntactic representation 
includes a PP (e.g., V NP PP), so that it is aligned with the semantic representation (but not 
the phonological representation), as in Figure 2a; according to semantic accounts, it does not 
include a PP (e.g., V NP), so that it is aligned with the phonological representation (but not 
the semantic representation), as in Figure 2b.    
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Cai et al. (2015) found that missing (elided) NP arguments in Mandarin are syntactically 
represented.  They showed that (full) DO targets were primed by DOs in which the Theme 
was missing (e.g., Niuzai mai-le yiben shu hou song-gei-le shuishou; ‘The cowboy bought a 
book and later gave the sailor [the book]’) to the same extent as by DOs in which the Theme 
was not missing (Niuzai mai-le yiben shu hou song-gei-le shuishou naben shu; ‘The cowboy 
bought a book and later gave the sailor the book’).  Similarly, PO targets were equally primed 
by POs with or without the Theme.  These results suggest that the missing element was 
represented in the syntactic structure in the same way as an overtly expressed element, as in 
Figure 2a, and are therefore consistent with syntactic accounts. 
In contrast, Cai, Pickering, and Sturt (2013) found that elided VPs in Mandarin are not 
syntactically represented. They showed that (full) DO targets were not primed by DOs in 
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which the VP was elided (e.g., Fuwuyuan xiang jie-gei shuishou naba qiang. Yinwei haipa 
reshi, chushi que bu xiang, ‘The waitress would like to lend the sailor the gun. Being afraid 
of getting into trouble, the chef would not like to [lend the sailor the gun]’), compared to 
when the VP was overtly expressed (… chushi que bu xiang jie-gei shuishou naba qiang, ‘… 
the chef would not like to lend the sailor the gun’). These results suggest that the internal 
structure of the elided VP (V NP NP) was not syntactically represented, and are therefore 
consistent with semantic accounts. 
Other priming evidence similarly indicates that some semantically specified elements are not 
syntactically specified. Raffray et al. (2014) examined sentences such as The celebrity began 
drinking the champagne (full VP sentence) and The celebrity began the champagne (coerced 
sentence). The semantic representation for both sentences specifies the nature of the predicate 
(i.e., drinking) involved in the event. However, Raffray et al. found that The celebrity began 
the champagne did not prime production of The clerk began reading the report, suggesting 
that the coerced sentence has no syntactic element corresponding to the missing predicate 
drinking. Instead it behaved like a non-coerced sentence such as the celebrity began the 
speech (in which there is no ‘missing’ predicate, as the speech refers to an event).  
In addition, Pappert and Pechmann (2013) showed that PO/DO sentences (e.g., Die 
Sekretärin backte ihrem Chef einen Kuchen ‘The secretary baked her boss a cake’) primed 
benefactive sentences (e.g., Der Soldat hob seinem Freund eine Zigarette auf, ‘The soldier 
saved his pal a cigarette’), despite their semantic differences: PO/DO sentences involve a 
simple transfer event, whereas benefactives involve a complex event comprising a creation or 
preparation event and a potential transfer or change of possession event (Shibatani 1996). 
These results suggest that they are nevertheless syntactically represented in the same way.
6
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Overall, these results provide evidence for the syntactic representation of some but not all 
missing elements (i.e., elements that are semantically but not phonologically represented). 
Moreover, they imply that patterns of structural priming can determine which missing 
elements are syntactically represented and which are not.  More generally, they suggest that 
priming can help determine the extent to which syntactic representations are aligned with 
semantic or phonological representations. 
2.2 Semantic representation 
Our model proposes that the semantic level of representation contains at least specifications 
of quantificational information, information structure, and thematic roles. We assume a single 
level of semantic representation, as most studies have focused on distinguishing different 
aspects of semantics from syntax and have not sought to distinguish among aspects of 
semantics. We first consider the representation of quantificational information and its relation 
to thematic roles. Raffray and Pickering (2010) reported that priming is sensitive to a level of 
semantic representation specifying quantifier scope (see also  Chemla and Bott 2015; Feiman 
and Snedeker 2016; Viau, Lidz, and Musolino 2010). They presented participants with 
doubly quantified prime sentences such as Every kid climbed a tree, which are ambiguous 
between a universal-wide interpretation (Every kid climbed a potentially different tree) and 
an existential-wide interpretation (Every kid climbed the same tree), together with a 
disambiguating picture that forced one or other interpretation. When they then read a 
different doubly quantified target sentence that also involved a universally quantified Agent 
and existentially quantified Patient (Every hiker climbed a hill), participants tended to 
interpret it in the same way.   
Participants did not tend to repeat the interpretation of Every hiker climbed a hill after active 
primes such as A kid climbed every tree, hence they did not simply repeat whether a referred 
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to one or potentially more than one entity. In contrast, they tended to repeat the interpretation 
of Every hiker climbed a hill after passive primes such as A tree was climbed by every kid.  
So they repeated the use of an agentive noun with a to refer to a single entity, even when this 
noun had a different grammatical function (i.e., subject versus oblique object) and was in a 
different linear position (i.e., first versus second NP). Participants therefore repeated 
mappings of scope to quantified thematic roles. Overall, these results support a semantic 
representation that encodes both quantificational and thematic information (but in which 
thematic roles are unordered). Critically, they do not support an account in which logical 
form (encoding quantification) constitutes a distinct level of representation between syntactic 
representation and final interpretation (e.g., May 1985).  
We also assume that the semantic representation contains a specification of information 
structure. By information structure, we mean the way in which information is packaged with 
respect to the current context, for example to reflect which information is known to the 
listener or is emphasized (e.g. Chafe 1976; Halliday 1967; Lambrecht 1994; Vallduvi 1992). 
In our account, information structure is specified with respect to thematic roles, for example 
that the Patient is emphasized (roughly corresponding to topic, theme, or given information, 
depending on theoretical framework).  
In support of this claim, Vernice, Pickering, and Hartsuiker (2012) showed that Dutch 
speakers repeated emphasis of particular thematic roles across sentences in the absence of 
syntactic or lexical repetition. They were more likely to produce passives with Patient-Agent 
order, which emphasized the Patient (e.g., Het meisje wordt overspoeld door de golf; ‘The 
girl is being soaked by the wave’), after Patient-emphasis WH-cleft sentences with Agent-
Patient order (Degegne die hij slaat is de cowboy; ‘The one who he is hitting is the cowboy’) 
than after Agent-emphasis WH-cleft sentences with Patient-Agent order (Degegne die hem 
38 
 
slaat is de cowboy; ‘The one who is hitting him is the cowboy’). These results further support 
a representation containing unordered thematic roles, and imply that these roles are specified 
with respect to information structure (see also Bernolet, Hartsuiker, and Pickering 2009).  
In all these studies, priming occurred between sentences that involved different entities 
and/or different predicates, implying that the relevant representations were abstracted over 
these elements. Other priming evidence similarly supports a semantic representation framed 
in terms of abstract predicates, event components, and entities (Bunger, Papafragou, and 
Trueswell 2013; Raffray et al. 2014; see section 2.4).  
2.3 Structural representations and the lexicon 
So far we have been concerned with characterizing the nature of syntactic and semantic 
representations, based on evidence of priming between sentences that share different aspects 
of structure in the absence of lexical repetition. These results provide evidence for at least 
some abstract representation of both syntactic and semantic structure.  But additionally, a 
particularly robust finding is that various types of structural priming are considerably 
enhanced by repetition of the head of the local tree (the so-called lexical boost; e.g., 
Branigan, Pickering, and Cleland 2000; Cleland and Pickering 2003; Hartsuiker et al. 2008; 
Pickering and Branigan 1998).
7
  Both the existence of abstract priming and the lexical boost 
are informative about the lexical basis for linguistic representation. 
Abstract syntactic priming provides evidence for a representation of syntax that is 
independent of lexical representation. The existence of priming between, say, give the woman 
a book and send the girl a letter indicates that the representation of grammatical information 
(here, about the DO structure) cannot be entirely localized to specific lexical entries.  This is 
incompatible with one interpretation of lexicalist theories such as categorial grammars 
(Steedman 2000) and HPSG (Pollard and Sag 1994).  Such theories assume a few very 
39 
 
general rules (e.g., function application, function composition, function substitution; 
Steedman 1987), but such rules cannot be the locus of abstract priming as the same rules are 
applied across alternations such as DO and PO.  To explain abstract priming, lexicalist 
theories must assume that the syntactic representations (e.g., VP/NP/NP in categorial 
grammar) are shared across lexical entries. Similarly, evidence of abstract semantic priming 
(e.g., emphasizing the Patient, or producing coerced structures) implies that such information 
is not purely localized to lexical entries. 
The existence of the lexical boost, however, also argues against an extreme structuralist 
account in which lexical information is not part of the central syntactic component, for 
example an account in which lexical entries are merely ‘slotted in’ to a representation derived 
entirely from abstract (lexically unspecified) syntactic well-formedness constraints.  Thus 
there must be a representation that encodes a binding between constituent structure and the 
lemma (syntactic component) of the lexical entry for the head.  For the sentence The man 
gives the book to the woman, this representation is [V[give] NP PP]VP, where give is a 
lemma (and not a complete lexical entry that additionally encodes semantic and phonological 
information).  Importantly, the binding between V and the lemma give is the same type of 
binding that connects representations at different levels of structure (e.g., the syntactic and 
semantic representations associated with The man gives the book to the woman), rather than 
the links that connect components of the syntactic representation itself (e.g., linking VP and 
V).  Repetition of the lemma and the syntactic well-formedness constraint that licenses the 
constituent structure (e.g., give and VP  V NP PP) then leads to an enhanced priming 
effect.
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This account accords with the finding that the lexical boost appears to be due to repetition of 
a particular lemma (e.g., give), rather than a lemma that is instantiated for particular feature 
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values (e.g., give [+SING, +PRES, +PROG]). Pickering and Branigan (1998) found a lexical 
boost whenever the verb lemma was repeated, irrespective of whether the prime and target 
verbs shared tense, number, and aspect features (e.g., The racing driver was showing the torn 
overall to the mechanic yielded the same lexical boost as The racing driver showed the torn 
overall to the mechanic for the target The patient showed his wound to the doctor). Such 
results occur because the binding is between the constituent structure rule and a lexical entry 
without reference to features such as tense, but presumably with reference to syntactic 
category (to ensure that only well-formed bindings occur).  
Little is known about priming of unbounded dependencies, and an interesting question is 
whether a constituent such as the book that the doctor gave to the patient would prime a PO, 
which would indicate whether a missing and an expressed NP differ in terms of a feature or a 
syntactic category.  This distinction can be seen in two versions of GPSG.  In both versions, 
the doctor gave to the patient is captured by VP/NP  V NP/NP PP and NP/NP  ∅.  
According to Gazdar et al. (1985; see also HPSG; Pollard and Sag 1994), the slash-category 
/NP is simply a feature ‘missing NP’.  It is therefore similar to other features such as number 
(although it differs in having internal structure), and we have already noted that priming 
appears unaffected by feature differences.  Thus this account predicts that priming should 
occur in this case just as it does from a PO prime.  But according to Gazdar (1981), slash 
categories differ at the categorical level from other categories.  Hence priming should be 
eliminated (or at least reduced) in this case.  We know of no evidence that distinguishes these 
accounts.  
Similarly to syntactic priming, abstract semantic priming provides evidence for a 
representation of semantics that is independent of lexical representation.  But there is also 
evidence for a lexical boost to semantic priming, even when the relevant elements are not 
41 
 
present in the phonological representation. Raffray et al. (2014) found priming of coerced 
sentences when the events that the prime and target sentences described involved different 
entities and different coerced predicates (e.g., The celebrity began the champagne primed The 
clerk began the report; see section 2.4), implying the existence of semantic representations 
that were abstracted over these elements.  However, they found a boost to priming when the 
coerced predicate was repeated between prime and target, even though the associated verb 
was not expressed:  The celebrity began the champagne (coerced predicate: drink) was a 
stronger prime than The caretaker began the stairs (coerced predicate: sweep) for The banker 
began the tea (coerced predicate: drink). These results suggest the existence of bindings 
between lexical items (whether expressed or not) and semantic representations. 
2.4 Structural representations and their interfaces 
An account of structural representations must also specify mappings between levels of 
representation. Evidence from priming supports a range of mappings between information 
encoded in the semantic representation and information encoded in the syntactic 
representation: between thematic roles and grammatical functions, between thematic roles 
and word order, between animacy and syntactic structure, and between event structures and 
syntactic structures.  
Cai, Pickering, and Branigan (2012) showed priming of mappings between thematic roles and 
grammatical functions. After hearing a Mandarin topicalized PO such as Naben shu niuzai 
song le gei shuishou, ‘The book, the cowboy gave [it] to the sailor’, participants tended to 
produce POs (e.g., Jingcha song-le yiding maozi gei shibing; ‘The policeman gave a hat to 
the soldier’), in which the same thematic roles were mapped to the same grammatical 
functions (Theme to direct object and Recipient to oblique object) but different word order 
positions.  
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They also showed priming between thematic roles and word order: Participants also tended to 
produce POs (with Theme-Recipient order) after hearing a topicalized DO (which also has 
Theme-Recipient order; e.g., Naben shu niuzai song-gei le shuishou; ‘The book, the cowboy 
gave the sailor [it]’). Köhne, Pickering, and Branigan (2014) similarly showed that German 
participants tended to produce sentences with Theme-Recipient order following a prime with 
Theme-Recipient order (e.g., Der Mann verspricht die Putzhilfe der Ehefrau; ‘The man 
promises the cleaning woman the wife’). Additionally, Chang, Bock, and Goldberg (2003) 
found priming that was compatible with thematic-function mappings or thematic-order 
mappings.
9
 Bock, Loebell, and Morey (1992) found that participants were more likely to 
produce descriptions in which an animate entity was a sentence-initial subject (e.g., The boy 
is woken by the alarm clock) after reading and repeating sentences with an animate sentence-
initial subject (Five people carried the boat, or Five people were carried by the boat) than an 
inanimate sentence-initial subject (The boat carried five people, or The boat was carried by 
five people). These results are compatible with priming of animacy-function or animacy-order 
mappings.  However, other research has not found priming of animacy to syntactic structure 
mappings (Bernolet, Hartsuiker, and Pickering 2009; Carminati et al. 2008; Huang et al. 
2016).  
Bunger, Papafragou, and Trueswell (2013) and Raffray et al. (2014) showed priming of 
mappings between components of event structures and syntactic structures. The former 
researchers demonstrated that speakers repeated mappings of components of motion events to 
syntactic structure. Participants who had read sentences in which information about the 
manner of a motion event was mapped onto the sentence-initial subject of the sentence (e.g., 
The zebra on the motorcycle entered the garage) were more likely to produce descriptions in 
which information about the manner of an unrelated event was similarly encoded in the 
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sentence-initial subject (e.g., The driver is going into the cave) than participants in a control 
condition (who were not exposed to primes).  
Raffray et al. (2014) investigated utterances expressing complex events in which speakers 
had a choice of how to map a complex event (e.g., the clerk beginning to read the report) onto 
syntactic structure.  Specifically, the complex event involved three semantic elements: an 
event lacking a (subordinate) event (the clerk beginning); an event lacking an entity (the clerk 
reading); and an entity (the report).  Speakers could map these semantic elements to two or 
three syntactic elements in the VP (i.e., V NP: began the report; or V V-ing NP: began 
reading the report). They were more likely to produce sentences such as The clerk began the 
report after sentences that similarly involved mappings to two syntactic elements (e.g., The 
celebrity began the champagne) than after sentences that expressed the same meaning (e.g., 
The celebrity began drinking the champagne) or used the same syntactic structure (e.g., The 
celebrity began the speech) but did not involve the same mappings.  In conclusion, priming 
can uncover the relationship between misaligned syntactic and semantic representations, just 
as it can uncover the nature of syntactic and semantic representations themselves.  
3. Implications and predictions  
Section 2 discussed the implications of research on structural priming for many aspects of 
linguistic representation in adult native speakers.  We now consider how our proposals relate 
to current theoretical linguistic frameworks.  We then consider priming in bilingualism as a 
means of understanding structural representations across languages, and priming in children 
as a means of understanding structural representations during language development.  We 
conclude by addressing broader implications and predictions of our proposals. 
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3.1. Implications for linguistic theory 
We have argued that structural priming supports separate representations encoding semantic, 
syntactic, and phonological information. The single semantic level includes quantificational, 
information-structural, and thematic information, including information pertaining to 
elements that are not overtly expressed.  The single syntactic level is specified in terms of 
grammatical categories (and does not include semantic, lexical, or phonological information). 
It captures local relations specifying linear order and hierarchical relations. It represents some 
missing elements, but there is no syntactic movement. 
Our account is therefore incompatible with ‘mainstream generative grammar’ (see Culicover 
and Jackendoff 2005) – the framework that is derived from early transformational grammar 
(Chomsky 1965) via Government and Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981) and the Minimalist 
Program (Chomsky 1995).  This framework assumes that the generative capacity of language 
is strictly associated with the grammar. An initially abstract syntactic structure is altered 
sequentially through movement of elements (transformations). The resulting surface syntactic 
structure forms the input into both Logical Form (a ‘covert’ level of syntactic representation 
that interfaces with semantic representations encoding sentence meaning) and Phonetic Form 
(which is concerned with sound-based aspects of the sentence).  
The assumption of autonomous syntax, into which phonological content is subsequently 
inserted, fits with evidence of priming between sentences without shared lexical content (e.g.,  
Bock 1989). The assumption that speakers may syntactically represent some elements that 
they do not utter fits with evidence that sentences with missing arguments prime sentences 
without missing arguments (Cai et al. 2015).  But in other respects ‘mainstream generative 
grammar’ is incompatible with priming evidence about linguistic representation. Most 
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fundamentally, priming studies provide no evidence for movement or a wide range of 
associated empty elements (e.g., traces, copies, or multiply dominated elements).  
The clearest example involves passive sentences. Under a mainstream generative account, 
passives involve movement of the underlying object to subject position in the surface 
structure (leaving an NP trace or equivalent), whereas intransitive (active) locatives do not. 
Hence the two sentence types involve very different representations. The mainstream account 
is therefore incompatible with evidence that intransitive locatives prime passives (Bock and 
Loebell 1990), and that unergatives prime unaccusatives (Flett 2006). For similar reasons, it 
is inconsistent with evidence that transitive locatives prime POs (Bock and Loebell 1990), 
that POs and DOs prime ‘light verb’ sentences and vice versa (Wittenberg 2014).  The 
assumption of a syntactic level of Logical Form (i.e., without specifications of meaning) is 
also incompatible with priming evidence for abstract semantic representations that specify 
quantifier scope (Chemla and Bott 2015; Raffray and Pickering 2010). Overall, the findings 
from structural priming do not support ‘mainstream generative grammar’. 
Our account is more compatible with a broad range of alternative frameworks that eschew 
syntactocentrism, and instead assume non-directional and constraint-based generative 
capacities (i.e., specifying well-formed structures) that do not involve movement and in 
which syntactic structure is ‘shallow’ and not limited to binary branching. Such frameworks 
include  the Parallel Architecture (Culicover and Jackendoff 2005; Jackendoff 2002), HPSG 
(Pollard and Sag 1994), and Construction Grammar ( Goldberg 1995).
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We focus here on the Parallel Architecture (Culicover and Jackendoff 2005; Jackendoff 
2002); see Jackendoff (2007) for an accessible and psycholinguistically oriented discussion. 
This framework assumes separate generative capacities for semantics, syntax, and phonology, 
and proposes that they are linked via interfaces, or mappings, that involve input from the 
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lexicon.  So the girl was chased by the dog might have the syntactic representation S[NP[Det 
N]VP[Aux V PP], the semantic representation CHASED[DOG, GIRL]-[ TOPIC]
11
 and the 
phonological representation /ðəɡɜ:lwəztʃeɪsdbɑɪðədɒɡ/.  The syntactic representation occurs 
through combination of ‘constraints’ (stored fragments of structure) such as S[NP VP] and 
NP[Det N].  Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) also proposed a further tier of syntactic 
structure that captures grammatical function information associated with the ordering of NP 
arguments. Lexical entries comprise constraints (again, stored fragments of structure) such as 
DEF - Det - /ðə / and GIRL - N - /ɡɜ:l/ that play a role in the composition of sentence 
structure. They act as interface rules constraining relations between semantic, syntactic, and 
phonological representations.  Such constraints yield coindexation of elements at different 
linguistic levels in parallel, for example DEF1 GIRL2, NP[Det1 N2], and /ðə/1 /ɡɜ:l/2 (with 
the indices indicating the links between representational levels).  All linguistic 
representations (whether semantic/syntactic/phonological or lexical) are stored in long-term 
memory. 
In many respects, this account is compatible with priming evidence.  The assumption that 
speakers and listeners access the same local syntactic constraints that are independent of 
semantics or phonology (e.g., VP[V NP PP] for a PO) is consistent with abstract syntactic 
priming over local structures.  Shallow syntactic structure and the associated assumption that 
many detailed distinctions are made in the semantics rather than syntax (and that there is no 
movement) are compatible with priming between intransitive locatives and passives. 
Association of a lexical entry with a syntactic constraint (e.g., linking the entry for give with 
the PO constraint) accounts for the lexical boost. The assumption of a grammatical function 
tier as part of syntactic structure is consistent with priming of thematic-function mappings. 
The assumptions of abstract semantic representations based on events, predicates, and 
entities, which may include elements not represented in the syntax, together with interface 
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constraints between semantics and syntax, are compatible with priming of semantic-syntactic 
mappings in sentences involving complement coercion and motion events (Raffray et al. 
2014; Bunger, Papafragou, and Trueswell 2013).  
This account is less compatible with evidence about the relationship between hierarchical 
relations and word order. Priming evidence suggests that hierarchical relations and word 
order are encoded in a single representation, because sentences with the same hierarchical 
relations but different word orders do not prime each other (Pappert and Pechmann 2014; 
Pickering, Branigan, and McLean 2002). In contrast, Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) 
proposed that there are independent constraints on hierarchical relations (constituency) and 
word order, as in GPSG (Gazdar et al. 1985) and HPSG (Pollard and Sag 1994). They argued 
that separating these constraints allows important generalizations, for example about 
regularities of phrasal ordering that are independent of hierarchical structure (e.g., about head 
position).  Though these generalizations may be important, priming suggests that they do not 
reflect the representations used in language processing (see discussion in Section 1.1). 
Additionally, the Parallel Architecture account assumes that thematic structure, 
quantification, and information structure involve different tiers within semantics. Current 
priming evidence supports semantic representations that are specified for thematic roles in 
conjunction with quantification (Raffray and Pickering 2010; priming of patients taking wide 
scope) and information structure (Vernice et al. 2012;  priming of patients receiving 
emphasis). However it does not discriminate whether these constitute one integrated semantic 
representation (as we have assumed) or multiple semantic representations for thematic roles, 
quantification, and information structure that are linked to each other (as in the Parallel 
Architecture account).  Further research might distinguish these accounts by investigating 
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whether priming involving two semantic components (e.g., quantification and information 
structure) is independent of another component (e.g., thematic roles). 
More generally, structural priming has implications for linguistic theory in offering a means 
of adjudicating between alternative analyses that cannot be determined using other methods. 
For example, it may be able to resolve long-standing debates about the appropriate 
representation of English ‘small clause’ structures (e.g., He called the boy a liar, for which 
acceptability judgments support both a structure in which the boy and a liar do not form a 
constituent, and a structure in which they do; see Matthews 2007): Under the former account, 
a sentence such as He called the boy a liar should prime a sentence such as The doctor gave 
the pharmacist the pills, whereas under the latter account it should not. Similarly, it could 
resolve the ongoing controversy about Chinese bei-passives (e.g., Nashan de men bei niuzai 
chuai-huai-le; ‘That door by the cowboy was kicked in’, for which acceptability judgments 
and constituency tests support both an analysis in which bei heads a prepositional phrase, and 
an analysis in which it heads a verb phrase; see Huang, Li, and Li 2009).  
3.2 Structural priming and representation across languages 
Our account is based on evidence from a range of languages with different characteristics 
(e.g., English, German, Mandarin, Basque). Importantly, structural priming occurs in all 
languages that have been investigated, including American Sign Language (Hall, Ferreira, 
and Mayberry 2014), and appears to exert similar effects. Moreover, priming evidence 
supports very similar representations for structures across languages. For example, Mandarin 
(a language unrelated to English) has an alternation that appears similar to the English 
PO/DO alternation, and Cai et al. (2011) found very similar priming as in English, with a 
comparable magnitude of priming and lexical boost.  Likewise, evidence from Basque (a 
language with ergative properties) supports syntactic representations that – like those found 
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in English – are independent of lexical, thematic and morphological content (Santesteban et 
al. 2015). Evidence from typologically distinct languages therefore suggests that our account 
is not restricted to a small range of Western Indo-European languages with quite specific 
characteristics. 
Many studies have shown strong priming in non-native speakers, even for structures that do 
not exist in their native language, and that priming has similar characteristics in natives and 
non-natives (e.g., occurring for the same constructions, and demonstrating the lexical boost;  
Cai et al. 2011; Flett, Branigan, and Pickering 2013; Kantola and van Gompel 2011; 
Salamoura and Williams 2006; Schoonbaert, Hartsuiker, and Pickering 2007). Current 
evidence therefore suggests that linguistic representation is similar for natives and non-
natives.  It of course remains possible that native and non-native linguistic representations 
differ in subtle ways (e.g., in relation to unbounded dependencies; Clahsen and Felser 2006). 
Strikingly, structural priming occurs between languages, with effects often being similar to 
those within languages.  It occurs between many pairs of languages with differing degrees of 
similarity (e.g., German and English: Loebell and Bock 2003; Dutch and English: Bernolet, 
Hartsuiker, and Pickering 2009; Spanish and English: Hartsuiker, Pickering, and Veltkamp 
2004; Korean and English: Shin and Christianson 2009; Mandarin and Cantonese: Cai et al. 
2011; Greek and English: Salamoura and Williams 2007). These studies of course 
demonstrate abstract structural priming (as the words are different across languages). But 
more interestingly, they imply that bilinguals not only use a common representational 
vocabulary across languages, but also the same structural representations where possible (and 
these representations are the same as those of monolinguals). One relevant restriction on 
structure sharing is word order:  Between-language priming is reduced or eliminated when 
the structures have different word orders across languages (e.g., English: the shark that is red 
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vs. Dutch: de haai die rood is; ‘the shark that red is’; Bernolet, Hartsuiker, and Pickering 
2007).  This restriction follows from our assumption that syntactic representations are 
specified for both hierarchical and linear relations.  Other studies of between-language 
priming support our claims that semantic representations encode thematic information and 
information structure (e.g., Bernolet, Hartsuiker, and Pickering 2009; Fleischer, Pickering, 
and McLean 2012).   
More speculatively, structural priming might allow researchers to detect linguistic universals 
that are accessible in adult speakers (i.e., not just as an ‘initial state’ that disappears during 
development). For example, priming has not been demonstrated with agglutinative languages.  
Our account assumes abstract syntactic structure, independent of lexical or morphological 
content, and hence that priming will occur between examples of the same structure where the 
verb involves considerable morphological differences.  For instance, a sentence with an NP 
PP V syntactic representation would prime another sentence with the same representation 
even if the verb contained many different morphemes, as is possible in an agglutinative 
language (e.g., Turkish). But if such priming does not occur (or is affected by morphological 
overlap), it would suggest that syntactic representations are morphosyntactically specified in 
such languages, so that there is no single well-formedness constraint VP  NP PP V, but 
rather different ones depending on the form of the verb. 
Another possibility is that constituent structure is not universal (e.g., Evans and Levinson 
2009).  For example, some researchers have argued that some languages (e.g., Walpiri) are 
‘non-configurational’ and do not have hierarchical constituent structure (Hale 1983; Austin 
and Bresnan 1996).  If so, they should not give rise to constituent structure priming within or 
between languages (though careful comparisons are clearly needed to control for other 
sources of priming such as thematic order priming).   
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We propose that a thorough analysis of priming across a full range of languages (e.g., 
agglutinative and isolating languages, languages with ergative characteristics, ‘non-
configurational’ languages, sign languages) is necessary to determine the extent to which our 
account holds universally, or whether different types of languages involve different 
representational structures.  If our account does not hold universally, then it may still be 
possible to establish that some properties are universal and some vary across languages. For 
example, all languages might involve a distinction between semantic and syntactic 
representations, but in some languages syntactic representations might include ‘missing’ 
elements and in some languages they might not. Priming might therefore allow us to develop 
a cognitive representational approach to language typology.   
3.3 Structural priming and language development 
Research on language development has – perhaps more strongly than research on adult 
language – recognized the importance of priming as a means of investigating structural 
representation (Bencini and Valian 2008; Messenger et al. 2012; Rowland et al. 2012; Savage 
et al. 2003). Structural priming occurs in children across age groups (e.g., 3-year-olds: 
Bencini and Valian 2008; 6- and 9-year-olds: Messenger, Branigan, and McLean 2012; 3-4-
year-olds and 5-6-year-olds: Rowland et al. 2012; 3-, 4- and 6-year-olds: Savage et al. 2003; 
7-8- and 11-12-year-olds: van Beijsterveldt and van Hell 2009), in comprehension as well as 
production (4-year-olds: Thothathiri and Snedeker 2008b), in different languages (e.g., 
English-speaking 4-5-year-olds: Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva, and Shimpi 2004; Spanish-
speaking 4- and 5-year-olds: Gámez et al. 2009; Russian-speaking 5-6-year-olds: Vasilyeva 
and Waterfall 2012), and populations, including bilinguals (between languages; 5-6-year-
olds: Vasilyeva et al. 2010), deaf children (11-12-year-olds: van Beijsterveldt and van Hell 
2009), children with Specific Language Impairment (4-6-year-olds: Garraffa, Coco, and 
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Branigan 2015; Leonard 2000; Miller and Deevy 2006; 6-7-year-olds: Riches 2012), and 
children with an Autistic Spectrum Disorder (8-13-year-olds: Allen et al. 2011; Hopkins, 
Yuill, and Keller 2016). Of course, some of these children cannot make grammaticality or 
acceptability judgments, and so it would simply not be possible to investigate their structural 
representations if researchers relied on these methods.  
Evidence from these studies suggests that from a relatively young age, children’s structural 
representations are similar to adults’. Like adults, 3- and 4-year-olds appear to have abstract 
syntactic representations that are not specified for lexical or thematic content (e.g., Bencini 
and Valian 2008; Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva, and Shimpi 2004; Messenger et al. 2012; 
Rowland et al. 2012). Rowland et al. showed that they tended to produce DOs after hearing 
and repeating DOs involving different nouns and verbs (e.g., Prime: The king brought the 
queen a puppy – Target: Dora gave Boots a rabbit). Messenger et al. (2012) showed they 
were primed to produce passives involving Patient/Agent thematic roles (e.g., The witch was 
hugged by the cat) to the same extent when the prime involved Experiencer/Theme roles 
(e.g., The girl was shocked by the tiger) and Theme/Experiencer roles (e.g., The girl was 
ignored by the tiger). There is some evidence of a lexical boost in children (3-4-year-olds: 
Branigan and McLean 2016; 7-8-year-olds: van Beijsterveldt and van Hell 2009).  
Interestingly, there is no evidence of a stronger lexical boost in young children compared to 
older children and adults (3-4-year-olds: Peter et al. 2015; Rowland et al. 2012), as might be 
expected on an account in which early grammars involve ‘islands’ of information associated 
with individual verbs, that is, partly lexicalized syntactic structures (Tomasello 1992).  These 
priming studies therefore contribute important evidence to the debate about the extent to 
which children’s early structural representations are abstract versus lexically specified (e.g., 
Fisher 2001; Goldberg 2006; Pinker 1989; Tomasello 2003).  
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Importantly, structural priming experiments have also provided evidence to discriminate 
specific theoretical linguistic accounts (motivated by error and frequency data) of young 
children’s syntactic representations. Messenger et al.’s (2012) demonstration of priming 
between Experiencer-Theme and Agent-Patient passive sentences provided evidence that 3-4-
year-olds’ have an abstract representation of passive structure that is not semantically 
restricted (contra Maratsos et al. 1985). Likewise, Messenger, Branigan, and McLean's 
(2011) demonstration of priming between short passives and full passives suggests that 3-4-
year-olds do not represent short passives in a distinct way from full passives (for example, as 
an adjectival phrase; Borer and Wexler 1987; Horgan 1976).  
Children’s semantic representations also appear similar to adults’. For example, Gámez et al. 
(2009) and Vasilyeva and Waterfall (2012) showed priming of thematic emphasis in Spanish-
speaking 4-5-year-olds and Russian-speaking 5-6-year-olds (with passive structures priming 
patient-emphasized structures), suggesting that children have a thematically specified 
representation of information structure. Viau, Lidz, and Musolino (2010) found priming of 
abstract quantified representations, with respect to the scope of negation, in 4-year-olds’  
comprehension. Children were more likely to adopt a negation-wide interpretation of Every 
horse didn’t jump a fence after hearing a sentence with a negation-wide interpretation than 
after a sentence with negation-narrow interpretation, even when the prime differed in syntax 
and quantifier order (e.g., Not every horse jumped over a pig).  These findings all suggest that 
at least from age three, children and adults have similar representational structures at each 
level, and similar interfaces between levels.  However, it is clearly necessary to test further 
structures, as well as younger children if possible. 
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3.4 Further implications 
We have argued that the method of structural priming is informative about linguistic 
representation with reference to evidence from monolingual adults but also bilingual adults 
and children.    Other relevant evidence relates to atypical populations, including 
demonstrations of structural priming in aphasia (Hartsuiker and Kolk 1998; Saffran and 
Martin 1997), Specific Language Impairment (Garraffa, Coco, and Branigan 2015; Leonard 
et al. 2000), and amnesia (Ferreira et al. 2008). For example, aphasic speakers may produce 
passives (although often containing morphological errors) after repeating unrelated passives, 
despite not producing such structures spontaneously. Such findings suggest that structural 
representations may be intact even if not evinced in patients’ spontaneous language behavior 
(and may be relevant to therapy).  More theoretically, priming evidence can be used to 
determine the structure of linguistic representations in language pathologies.  Additionally, 
the neural underpinnings of priming are not well understood (though see Menenti et al. 2011; 
Noppeney and Price 2004; Segaert et al. 2012; Segaert et al. 2013), but priming is likely to be 
informative about neurolinguistic representation.   
We further propose that structural priming can similarly be used to investigate other aspects 
of cognition involving structured representations.  These may include representations of the 
results of complex human activities involving domains such as music, mathematics, or 
artificial languages. In such cases, the representations may of course be derivative of 
linguistic representations (though it is also possible that they developed independently).  For 
example, Scheepers et al. (2011) showed that people tended to repeat their interpretation of 
complex arithmetical expressions that lacked brackets (in other words, copying the bracketing 
from prime to target) and moreover that language and arithmetic could prime each other.  
Similar priming occurred between language and music (van der Cavey and Hartsuiker 2016).    
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Another relevant domain is gesture, where evidence suggests that people repeat gesture 
patterns (Mol et al. 2012).  There is, however, no clear priming evidence about the structure 
of complex gestures expressing events (see Goldin-Meadow et al. 2008).  Additionally, it 
may be possible to investigate priming of structured animal calls (Schlenker et al. 2014). In 
these cases, there is either little evidence about structure or else it is simply assumed that 
some ‘standard’ representation (e.g., musical or mathematical notation) is adequate for 
explaining cognitive representations.  Priming may be informative about these 
representations and indeed the relationships between such representations across domains. 
Finally, we return to priming of comprehension – the tendency for comprehension to be 
affected by comprehension (or production) of previous utterances that share aspects of 
structure.  We have not focused on it because the data are much more limited and less clearly 
established than priming of production (e.g., there are contradictions concerning when 
priming occurs without verb repetition; Arai, van Gompel, and Scheepers 2007; Thothathiri 
and Snedeker 2008a), and because experimental conditions often differ extensively in both 
form and meaning (e.g., main clause vs. reduced relatives; see Traxler, Tooley, and Pickering 
2014).
13
  But priming of comprehension occurs when prime and target differ primarily in 
form (e.g., active/passive, PO/DO) and the effects reveal shared processes with priming of 
production (Segaert et al. 2013).  Priming in comprehension can be informative about the 
representation of structures in the absence of alternatives (i.e., when participants do not 
choose between alternative structures), in a way that appears hard to demonstrate in 
production.  It may also be valuable for investigating populations whose ability to produce 
language is restricted (e.g., very young children, some aphasics). Importantly, we propose 
that priming in comprehension is likely to become a technique of similar importance to 
priming in production for determining linguistic representation.
14
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4.  Conclusion 
Many linguists assume that acceptability judgments are pretty much the only valid means of 
obtaining data that are informative about linguistic representation. Instead, we have argued 
that structural priming can provide a valid method with many advantages, and have shown 
how experimental psychology (and not just traditional linguistics) can be informative about 
the nature of language.  We have now reached the stage at which structural priming is a 
mature method that provides extensive evidence about representation.  Thus, we have used 
that evidence to develop a general approach to linguistic representation. This account is 
largely (but not entirely) compatible with a parallel linguistic architecture (e.g., Culicover and 
Jackendoff 2005), though the data support the existence of some empty elements in the 
syntactic representation.  Structural priming provides evidence about linguistic representation 
that informs linguistic theory, processing accounts that are based on such theories, and claims 
about development and language universals.  It is a method that has truly come of age, and 
should help integrate linguistics and the psychology of language, as part of the cognitive 
sciences of language.  
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Notes 
                                                          
1
 Judgments may be non-binary, with sentences being judged more-or-less acceptable, most 
obviously when elicited using magnitude estimation tasks (Bard, Robertson, and Sorace 
1996) or Likert scales, but even researchers who eschew these methods usually assume that 
some sentences are ‘questionable’ or ‘marginal’.  However, these judgments still relate to set 
membership. 
2
 Priming effects can also be inhibitory (e.g., Goldinger, Luce, and Pisoni 1989), and  
speakers may on occasion avoid linguistic repetition (see Szmrecsanyi 2006). However, 
structural priming studies have so far focused on facilitatory effects. 
3
 Some models of language processing assume that the representations proposed by 
traditional linguistic theories are an approximation to statistical generalizations (that emerge 
with experience; see Seidenberg 2007). If so, structural priming effects are informative about 
these generalizations. For example, the evidence that priming occurs between sentences with 
different lexical content implies that some such generalizations are not tied to particular 
words. 
4
 The historical division of labor means that priming experiments concerned with 
representational questions have typically investigated hypotheses generated on the basis of 
acceptability judgments. But priming experiments are not parasitic on acceptability 
judgments, any more than any new scientific method is parasitic on an older method that 
addressed the same issues.  Acceptability judgments are chronologically primary to priming 
experiments (in the history of the language sciences), but are not theoretically primary. 
5
 Scheepers (2003) found that when people completed sentences such as The assistant 
announced the score of the candidate that they tended to repeat whether they attached the 
modifier to the first or the second NP (e.g., was the highest vs. was the oldest).  Another 
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experiment ruled out a purely semantic explanation.  Arguably, the sentence types involve the 
same set of context-free phrase structure rules (in particular, an NP consists of an NP 
followed by a complementized sentence).  One possible explanation is that priming may 
occur over larger elements of structure than strictly local trees.  If so, people may represent 
frequent or important ‘chunks’ of more global structure as well as local relations (see 
Culicover and Jackendoff 2005). However, this explanation provides no evidence against the 
existence of locally defined representations (Branigan et al. 2006). 
6
 Griffin and Weinstein-Tull (2003) found that people were more likely to produce Alison 
wished the bad news to be a mistake (vs. Alison wished that the bad news was a mistake) 
after Rover begged his owner to be more generous with food than after The teaching assistant 
reported the exam to be too difficult.  The primes have the same constituent order (NP V NP 
Vinf). They differ in semantics (report takes one argument (the event (difficult(exam)), 
yielding report(difficult(exam))), whereas begged takes two (the entity owner and the event 
generous(owner)), yielding begged(owner, generous(owner))); but the two version of the 
target have the same semantics (so this cannot be the locus of priming).  A possible 
explanation is that priming takes place over a syntactic representation in which an argument 
can be represented twice.  Thus, his owner is represented twice, corresponding to its semantic 
representation as an argument of begged and as an argument of generous; whereas the exam 
is represented once, as an argument of difficult. This explanation assumes that the syntactic 
representation includes missing elements.  The authors, however, interpret the priming in 
terms of a mapping between semantic and syntactic representations, and we cannot 
distinguish the accounts. 
7
 The lexical boost is not solely due to semantic similarity between prime and target, though 
such similarity enhances priming (Cleland and Pickering 2003): Cross-linguistic priming (see 
section 3.2) using translation-equivalent verbs is smaller than would be expected if the lexical 
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boost resulted purely from semantic repetition (Bernolet, Hartsuiker, and Pickering 2012; Cai 
et al. 2011; Schoonbaert, Hartsuiker, and Pickering 2007).  
8
 For convenience, we use X  Y Z to express declarative (non-directional) well-formedness 
constraints on representations.  
9
 We argued above that the lack of priming between sentences with V PP NP and V NP PP 
constituent order (Pappert and Pechmann 2014; Pickering, Branigan, and McLean 2002)  
supports a monostratal account of syntactic representation.  Compatible with Cai, Pickering, 
and Branigan (2012), there is no effect of unordered constituent structure, and the thematic-
order and thematic-function effects cancel each other out. 
10
 A challenge for Construction Grammar is the evidence that priming seems unaffected by 
whether prime and target involve the same construction (form-meaning pairing) or not.  Thus 
Konopka and Bock (2009) found equivalent priming within and between non-idioms (e.g., 
The graduating senior sent his application in) and idioms (e.g., The teenager shot his mouth 
off), which constitute different constructions in Construction Grammar. An explanation of 
such findings in terms of Construction Grammar would have to assume that the form 
component of constructions can be primed, and that priming takes place between different 
constructions that share form components to the same extent as it does within a construction.  
Hence priming could not be used to support the existence of form-meaning pairings.  
11
 In Culicover and Jackendoff’s (2005) account, information structure forms a separate tier 
of semantic representation from propositional structure. 
13
 Many studies demonstrate facilitation following repeated presentation of a construction, for 
example reduced processing times for strong garden path sentences (Fine et al. 2013) or 
marginally unacceptable sentences (Kaschak and Glenberg 2004), and a higher likelihood of 
judging marginally unacceptable sentences as acceptable (Luka and Barsalou 2005).  But the 
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relationship between such studies and structural priming studies involving individual prime-
target pairs is unclear. 
14 
Priming may affect response times in production (Corley and Scheepers 2002; Smith and 
Wheeldon 2001), but current evidence overwhelmingly relates to structure choice.  
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